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Lessons of the Phillips Curve
R
ecent estimates suggest
that real gross domestic
product increased at a
relatively slow annual rate of
around a half of a percent in 
the first quarter of 2007.
Meanwhile, year-over-year core
(PCE) inflation has been fluctu-
ating around 2
1⁄4 percent. While
the latter figure may sound
benign, I view it, and the general
upward trend in prices over the
past few years, with caution.
Inflation, in my opinion, has been too high and should be
brought down. But will doing so also lower 
economic growth? This raises a fundamental question 
facing the Federal Reserve and one that has been at the 
core of macroeconomics for the past 50 years. What is 
the relationship between growth and inflation?
In 1957, A.W. Phillips looked at data on unemployment
and wage inflation in the United Kingdom and found that as
unemployment went down, wage inflation tended to go up.
This statistical relationship became known as the “Phillips
curve.” Phillips’ work was highly influential, but in 
the decades since he published his findings, economists’
understanding of this relationship has evolved significantly,
and I would like to comment on that issue here.
In light of some additional work, many economists were
convinced that Phillips’ empirical findings also held for the
United States, and had argued that this implied a set of
choices for society. If you wanted faster economic growth,
you should put more money into the economy. This would
produce higher inflation, but that was a trade-off sometimes
worth making. Conversely, if you felt inflation was getting
too high, you should take money out of the economy. In
such a world, ambitious management of the macroeconomy
seemed possible.  
Beginning in the late 1960s, economists came to recognize
the importance of people’s expectations for the relationship
between inflation and real economic indicators such as
unemployment. Inflation that was anticipated would not
stimulate real economic growth, nor would disinflation that
was anticipated slow it. Over the long run, they argued, 
economic growth was determined by fundamentals such as
productivity and population growth. The appearance of a
correlation between inflation and unemployment in the
data was the result of episodes in which unanticipated
changes in inflation had temporary real effects.
This theory gained credence in the 1970s, as the U.S.
economy experienced both slow economic growth and 
rising inflation. The original Phillips curve seemed to be
breaking down, and the menu of options that policymakers
supposedly had at their disposal no longer seemed useful. 
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At the same time, a group of economists began to focus on
the forward-looking nature of people’s expectations. 
This “rational expectations” approach to the Phillips curve
suggested that the public understands when policymakers
might be tempted to try to exploit the seeming relationship
between inflation and unemployment, and change their
expectations even before a policy action has been taken. 
As a result, an attempt to bring down unemployment by 
letting inflation rise a bit will not work — prices will rise but
growth will not. 
Modern work builds on this approach by studying
economies in which realistic imperfections in markets 
create a short-run relationship between inflation and real
variables similar to what we observe in the data. 
These models have the important implication that the 
relationship between inflation and real activity is not causal.
Both inflation and unemployment are the outcomes of the
behavior of markets for goods and for labor. In turn, the
behavior of markets is the product of decisions made by 
an array of households, firms, and policymakers. If people
are forward-looking, their expectations about the future
conduct of policy will play the dominant role in how 
inflation and unemployment interact. This means that
unless policymakers can influence expectations, they will
have only limited ability to fine-tune the economy, even
temporarily, and that maintaining economic stability hinges
largely on people’s confidence in future policy actions.
In the late 1970s and early 1980s, the Federal Reserve
under Paul Volcker began a long and often difficult 
campaign to regain the credibility it had lost during the 
previous decade. Alan Greenspan continued that fight, 
and by the 1990s, the Fed arguably had established such 
credibility. Happily, the economy responded well: We 
witnessed rapid economic growth without a concomitant
rise in inflation. In light of the modern understanding of the
Phillips curve, the real lesson of the Volcker-Greenspan 
disinflation is that the best contribution the Fed can make
to economic growth is to keep inflation low and stable. And
the key to low inflation is the stability of people’s expecta-
tions about the future conduct of monetary policy. 
Monetary policy works best when it allows the real econ-
omy to respond appropriately to economic fundamentals,
rather than attempts to insulate the economy from shocks
by tolerating swings in inflation. This is the lesson of the 
modern Phillips curve and of our macroeconomic history
over the last half century.   
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